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Over the last two decades, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), the 
rate-setting body of the United States Federal Reserve System, has become 
increasingly communicative and transparent. According to policymakers, one of the 
goals of this shift has been to improve monetary policy predictability. Previous 
academic research has found that the FOMC has indeed become more predictable. 
Here, I contribute to the literature in two ways. First, instead of simply looking at 
predictability before and after the Fed’s communication reforms in the 1990s, I 
identify three distinct periods of reform and measure their separate contributions. 
Second, I correct the interest rate forecasts embedded in fed funds futures contracts 
for risk premiums, in order to obtain a less biased measure of predictability. My 
results suggest that the communication reforms of the early 1990s and the 
“guidance” provided from 2003 significantly improved predictability, while the 
release of the FOMC’s policy bias in 1999 had no measurable impact. Finally, I find 
that FOMC speeches and testimonies significantly lower short-term forecasting 
errors. 
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Central banks worldwide have shifted to more active and transparent commu-
nication policies over the past quarter century. There are several reasons for
this change, including non-economic ones like the need for independent central
banks in democratic societies to explain their actions. Another reason is the im-
pact of communication on the functioning of ￿nancial markets. Bernanke (2004)
asserts that ￿clear communication helps to increase the near-term predictability
of FOMC rate decisions, which reduces risk and volatility in ￿nancial markets
and allows for smoother adjustment of the economy to rate changes.￿
As the literature review in the following section illustrates, academic research
widely supports the idea that transparency improves predictability. The general
approach that has been taken is to identify an important reform in communica-
tion policy and compare average predictability before and after. This makes the
most sense for countries that have concentrated their reforms, like those that
switched to an in￿ ation targeting framework and its accompanying communica-
tion tools. The FOMC￿ s reforms, however, were conducted gradually over more
than ￿fteen years. As a result it is possible to identify the impact of particular
reforms - or at least series of reforms - separately. No earlier research that I am
aware of has pursued such an approach, motivating the work documented be-
low. Speci￿cally, I look at the e⁄ects of three periods of reform: ￿rst, the early
1990￿ s, starting with the new FOMC minutes; second, reforms around the turn
of the millennium when the FOMC started to reveal its policy bias directly after
meetings; third, after 2003, when the FOMC started to o⁄er explicit guidance
about the direction of policy rates. More information on these reforms can be
found in Section 3.
To evaluate the impact of transparency reforms on predictability one needs
a measure of the latter. Two methods are commonly used in the literature.
The ￿rst is to interpret the reaction of market interest rates after policy an-
nouncements as an indicator of how accurate markets had been in anticipating
new policy. The second is to extract expectations from the ￿nancial markets,
either from the yield curve or interest rate futures. The main advantage of the
latter approach is that expectations are available over longer horizons than just
between policy meetings. The main disadvantage is that market expectations
may be biased by risk premiums. Piazzesi and Swanson (2008) show how to use
business cycle indicators to correct for risk premiums in the Fed funds future
rate. I describe my application of their technique in Section 4. To the best of
my knowledge, I am the ￿rst to adopt their approach to study monetary policy
predictability.
My results, discussed in section 5, suggest that the introduction of FOMC
￿guidance￿in 2003 resulted in the greatest improvement in predictability, with
signi￿cant declines in forecast errors out to three months. The immediate release
of the FOMC￿ s ￿policy bias￿in 1999, which was later adjusted and relabeled
1the ￿balance-of-risks assessment￿ , failed to have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on errors.
Finally, the reforms of the early 1990s also lowered forecast errors signi￿cantly,
up to ￿ve months ahead.
Speeches by members of the Federal Reserve Board and Congressional tes-
timony by FOMC members are also important channels of communication.
Adding the number of speeches and testimonies per month to the analysis shows
a signi￿cant additional improvement to the predictability of policy. Section 6
provides robustness checks for the presented results.
2 Review of literature on predictability
A signi￿cant portion of the transparency literature1 studies the relationship be-
tween communication and the predictability of monetary policy in the ￿nancial
markets.2 Some theoretical papers have counter-intuitively suggested that more
transparency may actually impair predictability. A signi￿cant body of empiri-
cal research, however, tends to ￿nd the opposite e⁄ect. There are nonetheless
still some ways that the empirical literature can be advanced, motivating the
approach I take in the subsequent sections.
Intuitively, one would expect better public information to improve market
functioning, in the sense that ￿nancial markets become better at predicting the
outcome of unrealized fundamentals. This is true in a basic rational expectations
asset market model with exogenous public and private information.3 Under
di⁄erent assumptions or models, however, better public information can hamper
market functioning.
Probably the best known example is Morris and Shin (2002). They present
a model where the pro￿ts of individual agents depend not only on fundamental
values but also on the expectations of others (clearly an issue in any market
where assets can be sold before the realization of their fundamental value). Un-
der these circumstances a su¢ ciently clear signal from the central bank can act
as a coordinating point that could distract market participants from their pri-
vate information and possibly away from fundamentals. Svensson (2006) argues
that this conclusion is only valid for the unlikely situation that public signals
1Blinder, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, de Haan and Jansen (2008) and Cruijssen and Eij¢ nger
(2007) o⁄er overviews of the broader literature on transparency and monetary policy.
2A related strand of the literature does not address predictability in the ￿nancial markets
but examines the usefulness of central bank communication in contructing forecasts of mon-
etary policy. Some studies have simply asked if communications contain predictive power in
itself; examples include Mizen (2009) and Jansen and de Haan (2009). Other studies exam-
ine if communication is useful in improving models that forecast monetary policy, such as
the Taylor rule; recent examples are Sturm and de Haan (2009) for the ECB and Hayo and
Neuenkirch (2009) for the Fed.
3See Kool, Middeldorp and Rosenkranz (2011), where the case of exogenous private infor-
mation is equivalent to holding the fraction of informed traders constant.
2are less precise than private information. However, Demertzis and Hoeberichts
(2007) add costly information acquisition to Morris and Shin (2002)￿ s model
and ￿nd that it strengthens the result.
Another theoretical model by Dale, Orphanides and Osterholm (2008) demon-
strates that if the private sector is not able to learn the precision of the central
bank￿ s information, it may overreact to central bank communication. Kool et al.
(2011) ￿nd that public information can crowd out investment in private informa-
tion, which hampers predictability, a conclusion supported by the experimental
work of Middeldorp and Rosenkranz (2011).
Despite the theoretical caveats, the vast majority of empirical research on
transparency has concluded that in practice transparency improves the pre-
dictability of monetary policy in the ￿nancial markets. The general approach
is to select a watershed communication reform and test the di⁄erence between
predictability before and afterwards. US studies typically use the ￿rst announce-
ment of the Federal Open Market Committee￿ s (FOMC) rate decisions in Febru-
ary 1994, while for other countries the introduction of an in￿ ation target, with
its accompanying communication tools, is used. One can measure predictability
in at least two ways. The ￿rst is to ascertain how surprised ￿nancial markets
are by policy decisions. The second extracts expectations from the yield curve
or futures to see how accurate they are.
The ￿rst approach to assessing the predictability of monetary policy involves
examining market movements close to policy decisions. Little reaction in money
market rates following a policy rate change suggests that it has been priced in
and that policy is predictable. Money market movements prior to the decision
in the same direction as the rate change can be interpreted as anticipating the
move. Swanson (2006) ￿nds that US interest rates show less reaction to Fed
decisions over the period where the Fed reformed its communication policy.
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007b) conclude that FOMC communication reforms
of 1999 did not reduce surprises (although they present evidence that they did
result in ￿nancial markets focusing more on the post-meeting statement rather
than other forms of Fed communication).
Holmsen, Qvigstad, ￿istein Rłisland and Solberg-Johansen (2008) ￿nd lower
volatility on the days the Norges Bank announced its decisions after it started
to release forecasts of its own interest rates. Murdzhev and Tomljanovich (2006)
and Coppel and Connolly (2003) show that policy changes are better anticipated
in, respectively, six and eight advanced economies. Although such an approach is
fairly intuitive and clear cut, its disadvantage is that it only provides a measure
of market expectations between meetings and at the time of rate announcements.
Communication reforms that allow market interest rates to anticipate monetary
policy earlier than one meeting ahead can￿ t be identi￿ed.
A second method is to measure market expectations of monetary policy
and examine how accurate these are. Typically expectations are either ex-
3tracted from the yield curve or futures data. Here too, ￿ndings suggest that
transparency improves predictability. Ra⁄erty and Tomljanovich (2002) and
Lange, Sack and Whitesell (2003) ￿nd better accuracy for the US Treasury
yield curve. Lildholdt and Wetherilt (2004) use a term structure model to show
an improvement in the predictability of UK monetary policy. Similarly, Toml-
janovich (2004) extracts expectations from bond yield curves and ￿nds that
forecast errors decline in seven advanced economies after transparency reforms.
Regarding futures rates, Swanson (2006) and Carlson, Craig, Higgins and
Melick (2006) ￿nd that the Fed funds futures are better able to predict US
monetary policy after communication reforms. Kwan (2007) concludes that
forward looking language or guidance, introduced in 2003, has helped to lower
the average error between the Fed funds futures and the actual outcome of the
Fed funds rate.
The disadvantage of using bond market expectations, is that such estimates
are likely to be biased. The failure of the expectations hypothesis for the Trea-
sury yield curve is a well-documented empirical result (e.g. Cochrane and Pi-
azzesi (2005), Campbell and Shiller (1991), Stambaugh (1988), Fama and Bliss
(1987)). Risk premiums on interest rates are positive on average and time-
varying. Sack (2004) and Piazzesi and Swanson (2008) show that Fed funds
futures rates also include risk premiums, particularly at longer maturities. Pi-
azzesi and Swanson (2008) demonstrate how to adjust Fed funds futures rates
for time-varying risk premiums using business cycle data. I apply their method
in the analysis below. A more detailed description of their approach is provided
in Section 4.
3 Identifying FOMC communication reforms with
overlapping dummies
To analyze the relationship between transparency and predictability one needs
indicators for both. As I show in this section, one way the former can be attained
is by the use of dummies that identify periods of di⁄erent communication policies
in a regression analysis. In the next section I describe an approach for measuring
predictability.
Starting in the early 1990s the FOMC reformed its communication policy
in a sequence of initiatives. It was a gradualist approach, which Cleveland Fed
President Pianalto (2005) describes as the way that the FOMC ￿learned to talk.￿
It has the advantage for researchers that it allows these reforms to be separated
in time, which makes it possible to examine their impact individually. One way
to do so is to use a dummy for each reform which is activated (i.e. set to 1) for the
period after which each reform was implemented. These overlapping dummies
4can then be used as independent variables in a regression with a measure of
predictability as the dependent variable.
Table 1 lists eight reforms that might be represented by overlapping dummy
variables. Unfortunately, only a few months of data separate some of the poten-
tial dummies, making it di¢ cult to con￿dently identify separate impacts on the
predictability of policy. Furthermore, the more dummies one uses the greater
the risk that the regression estimator will ￿t them to unrelated ￿ uctuations in
the data. To put in another way, one can perfectly describe any data set with
su¢ cient dummies.
Date Label Nature of Change
1993 Mar Minutes Merging of FOMC “ Minutes of Actions”  and “ Policy Record”  into
one new document labeled the “ Minutes of the FOMC”
1994 Feb Statement First post-meeting statement with qualitative description of change in policy
1994 Aug Rationale Some reasoning behind the decision is added to the statement
1995 Jul Fed funds target Inclusion of actual numerical Fed funds target in statement
1999 May Bias Inclusion of FOMC’ s asymmetric policy directive in statement
2000 Jan Balance of risks Revised statement language discussing balance of risks towards growth or
inflation rather than bias for Fed funds target
2002 Mar FOMC vote Inclusion of vote with name(s) of dissenters in statement
2003 Aug Guidance Statement language explicitly indicating the likely direction of rates
over extended period
2005 Jan Earlier minutes Minutes released three weeks after meeting
2007 Nov Enhanced
projections
More detailed, frequent and extended projections
Table 1: List of FOMC communication reforms 1993-2007
To avoid over￿tting the sample I choose three reforms (boldface in Table
1) that are separated by over four years and that are followed by at least one
interest rate cycle. These are: ￿rst, the release of the FOMC minutes; second,
the release of the FOMC￿ s policy bias in the statement; and third the ￿guidance￿
or explicit language in the statement about the likely direction of interest rates.
I argue in the remainder of this section that these are the most natural points to
turn the overlapping dummies on (i.e. set the values to 1) and that, particularly
for the ￿rst dummy and to some degree for the second, they are markers for a
series of related reforms that are too close to separate statistically. Later on,
in Section 5 I present the regression results using these dummies. Section 6
compares these results to those of alternative speci￿cations that use di⁄erent
starting points for the dummies and shows that the conclusions of the analysis
are not sensitive to variations in the starting points.
53.1 Dummy 1: new minutes and the FOMC statement
The traditional choice for the starting point of the FOMC￿ s move towards
greater transparency is the February 1994 introduction of the post-meeting
FOMC statement, in which the public was immediately informed of changes
in Fed policy. The actual impact of the statement, however, was not really that
momentous. The announcement itself, in the words of former Fed o¢ cer Stephen
Axilrod (2009), who for many years was the daily link between the Chairman
and the open markets desk, ￿had the advantage of eliminating the remote pos-
sibility that actions by the FOMC￿ s manager for open market operations could
inadvertently mislead the market about the Committee￿ s decision￿ . Generally
the markets quickly ￿gured out that the FOMC had changed the interest rate
target, even though the FOMC had not told them. It thus seems unlikely to
have made much di⁄erence in the outlook for a month or more ahead, which
are the horizons of predictability that I measure below.
Although announcing the change in the Fed funds rate target may not have
been particularly substantive, for many researchers it does make sense as a
starting point for a general trend towards transparency. The statement became
more informative as it evolved and became one of (if not the) most widely
reported and quoted FOMC communication tool. Starting in August 1994 the
FOMC included its reasoning behind the Fed rate decision in the statement,
although this was still more concise and less descriptive than the reasoning
provided in statements in later years. It did not contain a quantitative Fed funds
target until 1995 and before 1999 it was only released if the FOMC actually
changed policy (the last change coincides with the release of the asymmetric
policy directive, discussed below). It is thus reasonable to see the February
1994 announcement as preceding a series of reforms that together were indeed
substantive.
However, if one is interested in identifying the starting point of this reform
period, the March 1993 introduction of the FOMC minutes is a more logical
choice because it actually was the very ￿rst reform of the period. Granted, it
looks at least as innocuous as the release of the statement. The new minutes
were the product of merging two earlier FOMC documents called the ￿Minutes
of Actions￿ and the ￿Policy Record￿ that were released after the subsequent
FOMC meeting. Although the minutes later evolved into a somewhat more
descriptive document, it essentially contained the same information as the ear-
lier reports and was initially released with the same delay. The creation of the
new minutes, however, was not motivated by administrative e¢ ciency but by
a more substantive desire to achieve better communication. According to the
transcripts of the ￿rst meeting of which the new minutes were released, there
was a feeling within the FOMC that ￿the public, including important public
policy o¢ cials, has very little appreciation for the quantity and detail of ma-
terial that we already release￿and so the idea was to make the new minutes
more ￿convenient and easily accessible.￿ Consequently there is a case to be
6made that, even though the substance was not markedly di⁄erent, it raised the
awareness and accessibility of the information available, just as the FOMC had
intended. Indeed, Tomljanovich (2004) ￿nds evidence that the improvement in
the predictability of monetary policy occurs a year earlier than an hypothesized
break-point of February 1994, thus lending further support to the using the
release of the new minutes as the starting point for the ￿rst dummy.
3.2 Dummy 2: Bias and outlook
May 1999 saw the FOMC announcing its ￿tilt￿or ￿bias￿for future policy in its
post-meeting statement. It was an important shift because the FOMC started
to systematically say something about the balance of risks that could steer
future policy in a particular direction. The possibility of an asymmetric policy
directive had existed since 1983. Technically it allowed a change in monetary
policy between meetings in the direction of the ￿bias￿without the consent of
the full FOMC. Since the policy directive is contained in the minutes, essentially
the decision to announce it directly after the meeting brought it to the public
around six weeks earlier. Many ￿nancial markets participants, however, saw it
as a deliberate signal of the intentions of the FOMC. According to St. Louis
Fed President Poole (2003), ￿many members of the FOMC believed the market
overreacted to the May tilt statement and to subsequent tilt statements as well￿
which motivated a change in language in January 2000 to a ￿balance-of-risks￿
to price stability and growth. Poole (2003) says that it was ￿the FOMC￿ s
stated intention that its new ￿balance-of-risks￿ was not to be interpreted as
an indicator of future FOMC actions.￿ Rasche and Thornton (2002) present
evidence that, nevertheless, analysts still used it to form such expectations.
3.3 Dummy 3: Interest rate guidance
Starting in August 2003 the FOMC began sending explicit signals about the
likely stance of policy in the future. Both the overt nature of the signal and its
longer horizon were important changes. In 2003 the statement included the text
￿policy accommodation can be maintained for a considerable period.￿In 2004,
when the FOMC started hiking rates, it said ￿ . . . policy accommodation
can be removed at a pace that is likely to be measured.￿Some reference to the
potential need for further policy tightening was part of every statement before
March 2007 when it was removed, according to the FOMC minutes, ￿in light of
the increased uncertainty about the outlook for both growth and in￿ ation.￿The
FOMC returned to signaling the future stance of policy in December 2008 when
it started to include the following in the statement, ￿the Committee anticipates
that weak economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of
the federal funds rate for some time,￿the last part of which was adjusted in
March 2009 to "an extended period."
7Even though the FOMC refrained from providing guidance during part of
the period, I activate the dummy from August 2003 until the end of the sample.
By doing so I am essentially saying that there is a policy in place to provide
guidance whenever the FOMC is con￿dent enough to provide a forecast. A lack
of guidance is thus a message that the FOMC considers the monetary policy
outlook to be uncertain. That being the case, it is best not to switch the
dummy on only when guidance is provided because it would mean creating a
connection between its value and con￿dence in the economic outlook and the
better predictability that is likely to follow (at least if such con￿dence has some
basis in subsequent reality).
3.4 Excluding other reforms
Above I associate three periods of reform with dummies. The ￿rst is for the early
reforms which saw the FOMC providing basic information about the current
target rate and the reasoning behind policy changes. The second covers implicit
information about the likely direction of interest rates provided in the bias and
balance-of-risks components of the statement. The third covers explicit guidance
about the likely direction of interest rates.
There were, however, three other reforms that were not clearly related to
the categorization of the dummies, namely the addition of the FOMC vote to
the statement (March 2002), the earlier release of the minutes (January 2005)
and the enhanced projections (November 2007). I do not assign them separate
dummies for three reasons. First, as explained above, in order not to over ￿t
the sample I want to use only a few dummies where each straddles at least
one monetary policy cycle. Second, the FOMC vote and the earlier release of
the minutes largely overlap with the ￿guidance￿dummy, making it di¢ cult to
identify a separate e⁄ect. Third, the introduction of the enhanced projections is
too close to the end of the sample (only 14 observations) to identify its impact.
In the current setup, any e⁄ect from the FOMC vote and statement will
largely (in the case of the vote) or entirely (in the case of the earlier minutes)
be attributed to the ￿guidance￿dummy. However, any such e⁄ects are likely to
be small and isolated. Including the vote in the statement probably gave the
markets a better sense of the uncertainty surrounding the economic outlook and
future rate decisions; rather than provide a clear signal about the future it is an
indicator of the (lack of) precision of the FOMC￿ s guidance. Furthermore, the
vote was already included in the minutes. Adding it to the statement released
the information approximately six weeks earlier. Similarly, moving the minutes
forward from about six weeks to three weeks after the FOMC meeting changed
the timing but probably not the nature of the release.
84 Fed funds futures and risk premiums
The approach to measuring predictability used here is to compare the expecta-
tions re￿ ected in Fed funds futures to the actual outcome of monetary policy.
As explained directly below, the Fed funds are the best indicator of market
expectations, but still need to be adjusted for risk premiums.
Fed funds futures contracts have been traded at the Chicago Board of Trade
since October 1988. They are contracts on the average e⁄ective Fed funds rate
in one of the upcoming twenty-four months. Their prices are determined by
market supply and demand. When the contracts expire they are cash settled at
100 minus the average daily overnight Fed funds rate for the delivery month. For
example if the average Fed funds rate equaled 4.75% in June, then on the ￿rst
business day of July the June contract would be settled at 95.25. If an investor,
expecting the FOMC to cut interest rates, had bought the June contract several
months ago at 94 (implying an expected average funds rate of 6%) and held it
until expiration, that person would have made a positive return on investment
of 1.3% .4
I use Fed funds futures prices, measured at the last day of the month, as pro-
vided by EcoWin, for contracts that expire in the upcoming one to six months.
The data is complete for the entire period except for the ￿ve and six month
futures, which have some missing data in 1988-1990.
The Fed funds futures have three advantages as indicators of ￿nancial market
expectations of monetary policy. First, it is not necessary to derive expectations
from an interest rate curve: 100 minus the current price is a straightforward fore-
cast of the future rate. Second, the future rate relates directly to the Fed funds
rate, avoiding the need to infer the Fed funds rate indirectly from expectations of
another interest rate. Third, Fed funds futures contracts are the most accurate
￿nancial market predictor of the Fed funds rate. Gurkaynak, Sack and Swanson
(2007) ￿nd that the federal funds futures dominate all the other securities in
forecasting monetary policy on horizons out to six months.
On the other hand, Sack (2004) and Piazzesi and Swanson (2008) have es-
tablished that even though the Fed funds futures are the best market forecasts
of the Fed funds rate they are biased by the presence of risk premiums. In
that respect there is no di⁄erence between expectations derived from the yield
curve and those derived from the futures market. Piazzesi and Swanson (2008)
show how to correct for risk premiums in monthly data. They demonstrate
that excess returns of the futures rate above actual interest rates ￿ uctuate in
line with several business cycle indicators. Their best results are achieved by
the straightforward method of regressing the excess returns on the level of the
Fed funds future rate and the year-on-year changes in nonfarm payrolls measure
4=(95.25-94)/94. The face value of the contract is $5 million, so the pro￿t would be $62.5
thousand per contract.
9of employment. The level of the futures forecast, fn
t , is also included in the
regression to control for the fact that higher excess returns accompany higher
levels of interest rates.
The excess return is de￿ned as
(1) et+n = fn
t ￿ rt+n
t month index
n contract index (months t + 1 to t + 6)
et+n excess return at t + n
fn
t Closing rate of Fed funds future contract on last trading day of month t for settlement at t + n
rt+n Average Fed funds rate for month t + n
The benchmark regression run by Piazzesi and Swanson (2008) is







pt￿1 Log payrolls t ￿ 1 minus t ￿ 13 (year-on-year employment change)
c Constant
It is important that the regression only contains information known at the
time that the future price is determined because the idea it to identify pre-
dictable excess returns. Intuitively, if the excess return is to be seen as a risk
premium, then risk perception of market participants is in￿ uenced only by in-
formation available on the last trading day of month t. This means that the
most recent payrolls data is from month t ￿ 1 (released on the ￿rst Friday of
month t).5 It is also necessary to use the payrolls data actually available at that
time and not the revised data.6
Piazzesi and Swanson show that the coe¢ cients in the above regression are
signi￿cant for one to six month maturities, with the exception of the payrolls
coe¢ cient for the one month maturity. Below I use the Piazzesi and Swanson￿ s
approach to control for predictable and time-varying excess returns.
The measure of predictability itself is simply the forecast error of the Fed
funds futures, which I de￿ne as the absolute value of the futures rate minus the
corresponding actual Fed funds rate. Equation (3) is nothing more than the
absolute value of Equation (1).
(3) jet+nj = jfn
t ￿ rt+nj
5Using the latest release of the weekly initial jobless claims, which is closer to the last day
of the month, does not improve on the results of Piazzesi and Swanson (2008).
6Vintage real-time data is available from the Philadelphia Federal Reserve Real-Time Data
Research Center. Not only does one need the original unrevised t-1 value but also the revised,
but not ￿nal revision, value of t-13 that is known at t-1.
105 Regression and results
Equation (4) represents the exact regression speci￿cation used in the analysis
below. It has two parts, the control for risk premiums described in the previous
section and the dummies described in Section 3. The regression is run using
monthly data from October 1988 to October 2008 (241 months).





















t+n binary variable equal to 1 if et+n > 0 and 0 otherwise
e
￿
t+n binary variable equal to 1 if et+n < 0 and 0 otherwise
￿ coe¢ cients for dummies
d1993 Binary variable, 1 for March 1993 to October 2008 (177/241 months)
d1999 Binary variable, 1 for May 1999 to October 2008 (114/241 months)
d2003 Binary variable, 1 for August 2003 to October 2008 (63/241 months)
Regarding the control for risk premiums, there is a small complication in
that the risk premiums in Piazzesi and Swanson￿ s equation are estimated over
the excess returns. The regression above, on the other hand, is estimated on the
absolute errors. The solution is to split the Piazzesi and Swanson component





positive errors and negative errors respectively, and then ￿ ip the sign for the
latter (i.e. multiply by -1). Doing so does not a⁄ect the results of Piazzesi
and Swanson correction, which can easily be con￿rmed by running this part of
the regression both normally and with the adjustment and then comparing the
identical results.
Using the natural log of the absolute forecast error as the dependent variable
signi￿cantly improves the statistical properties of the model. It transforms the
distribution of the absolute errors from one that is all positive and skewed, to
one that is roughly symmetrical. This results in better behaved residuals and
avoids the equation predicting negative absolute errors.
The above regression equation produces the results presented in Table 2. Re-
ported are Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard
errors.
11n=1 n=2 n=3 n=4 n=5 n=6
Constant (χ) -2.67 *** -2.09 *** -1.88 *** -1.51 *** -1.29 *** -1.79 ***
Constant (γ) 0.02 0.36 * 0.31 -0.04 -0.15 -0.56 **
Future rate (ʱ) 0.07 * 0.08 * 0.11 * 0.13 ** 0.18 ** 0.35 ***
Payrolls (β) -17.02 ** -28.86 *** -30.92 *** -23.26 ** -30.54 ** -49.25 ***
Minutes (ʴ1993) -0.54 ** -0.68 *** -0.51 * -0.51 * -0.54 * 0.09
Bias (ʴ1999) -0.28 -0.02 0.00 -0.08 0.04 0.17
Guidance (ʴ2003) -0.95 *** -0.79 ** -0.53 * -0.16 -0.14 -0.14
*p<10% **p<5% ***p<1%
Table 2: Impact of reforms on Fed funds future errors
Results show that the communication changes following the introduction of
the minutes and the guidance policy both lowered errors with varying degrees
of signi￿cance. The bias, however, does not seem to have any signi￿cant e⁄ect.
The guidance policy signi￿cantly lowers errors up to three months ahead and
the e⁄ects are the most substantial measured. With the exception of the eve of
the subprime crisis in 2007, whenever the FOMC provided guidance it was also
correct in its assessment of the future course of interest rates. As a result policy
generally lowered errors. It also con￿rms the earlier ￿nding by Kwan (2007)
that guidance improved predictability.
The bias (May 1999) and subsequent balance-of-risks (January 2000), on
the other hand, do not seem to have signi￿cantly helped markets in actually
predicting monetary policy. Part of the reason may be that, as many FOMC
members thought, the markets did overreact to the bias or that, as the FOMC
said, the balance-of-risks statement was not a signal about future rates. Also,
perhaps one should not expect too much from the release of the bias because
the policy directive was already contained in the minutes, which were released
about six weeks later anyway. This could explain why the biggest impact in the
results happens for the one month ahead forecast, although it is still not strong
enough to be signi￿cant.
The new FOMC minutes - at least as a marker for the early series of reforms
- has a signi￿cant impact over the longest horizon, up to ￿ve months ahead.
It is only weakly signi￿cant beyond a two month horizon. In some sense the
signi￿cant long horizon e⁄ect is a surprise because the early reforms involved
little signaling of future interest rates. On the other hand the more accessible
minutes and the increasingly descriptive statements probably helped the market
participants to better understand what motivated Fed policy and thus made
them more accurate in translating their own economic expectations into policy
predictions. As Bank of England Governor Mervyn King (2000) argued (just
before he famously said that a ￿successful central bank should be boring￿ )
a better understanding of the ￿monetary policy reaction function￿ should in
12itself lead to ￿policy being predictable￿ and as such ￿the news should be in
developments of the economy.￿
It may also be the case that the release of the minutes and the evolution
of the statement coincided with more open Fed communication policy through
all its channels, new and old. Speeches and Congressional testimony made
by the Chairman and other FOMC members are channels that predate the
communication reforms. To test if this channel is also important I supplement
the above regression with the number of speeches per month given by Fed board
members and FOMC Congressional testimony. Unfortunately, speeches are only
available on the Fed Board of Governors website since June 1996, limiting my
sample and necessitating the removal of the ￿rst dummy.

















t￿1) + ￿1999d1999 + ￿2003d2003 + &s
s Number of Fed Board speeches and FOMC Congressional testimony
n=1 n=2 n=3 n=4 n=5 n=6
Constant (χ) -2.77 *** -2.74 *** -2.54 *** -2.00 *** -1.80 *** -1.50 ***
Constant (γ) -0.01 0.19 0.08 -0.16 -0.40 -0.82 **
Future rate (ʱ) 0.07 0.24 ** 0.27 ** 0.22 * 0.35 * 0.47 ***
Payrolls (β) -14.57 -54.63 *** -56.30 *** -33.13 -59.48 * -63.95 **
Bias (ʴ1999) -0.30 0.22 0.21 0.05 0.13 0.20
Guidance (ʴ2003) -0.84 *** -0.71 ** -0.41 -0.05 0.02 -0.04
Speeches (ς) -0.06 ** -0.04 * -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04
*p<10% **p<5% ***p<1%
Table 3: Impact of reforms and Speeches on Fed funds future
errors
The results presented in Table 3 suggest that more speeches and testimony
help the markets to better understand monetary policy and signi￿cantly im-
prove predictability at the one month horizon and, with weak signi￿cance, at
two months ahead7. With an average of almost eight speeches per month, the
7Those familiar with the practice of the ￿black-out period￿, whereby FOMC members
refrain from commenting on monetary policy around rate setting meetings and the Chairman￿ s
semiannual testimony to the Congress, may suspect that this explains the results. Fewer
speeches due to the black-out might be correlated with any impact that the outcome of
monetary policy meetings or testimony have (both in terms of reaction to surprise rate moves
or new information contained in the statement or testimony). However, due to the six week
schedule of the FOMC and the two months of the Chairman￿ s the semi-annual testimony, 80%
of the months include a black-out period. In any case, the inclusion of a dummy for months
with a meeting or semiannual testimony does not a⁄ect the outcome.
13cumulative e⁄ects are typically a little more than half as strong the e⁄ect of
explicit policy guidance and approximately on par with the e⁄ect of the early
communication reforms.8
6 Alternative speci￿cations
In Section 3 I argue, on the basis of economic and statistical considerations,
for the FOMC minutes (1993), the release of the bias (1999) and guidance on
the direction of interest rates (2003) as the most logical starting points for
the three dummies in my analysis. The last of these was a clear-cut change in
communication policy that was communicated as such by the FOMC and, when
feasible, implemented in a similar fashion up to the present. The FOMC minutes
and the bias, on the other hand, were closely followed by other di⁄erent reforms.
Indeed, as discussed above, both do not appear to be especially substantive
reforms in their own right. I argue that the dummies represent a series of
reforms and the impact on predictability should thus be seen as coming from
their collective e⁄ect. However, there is a risk that starting the dummy too soon
on an irrelevant, or worse, counterproductive reform could hide the impact of
the other reforms.
To check if some of the other reforms might be better starting points for
the ￿rst two dummies I compare how well di⁄erent speci￿cations ￿t the data.
Table 4 presents the R2 of models with alternate initial reforms.9 The R2 is
reported for each of the six variations of the minutes, statement, rationale, bias
and outlook variables (see Table 1 for descriptions) for each of the 1 - 6 month
ahead timeframes. The last column is the average of the R2 over all timeframes
for that speci￿cation. The asterisk denotes the highest R2 within the column.10
Complete regression results from these speci￿cations are shown in the Appendix
(with the exception for the minutes-balance-guidance variant, which is presented
below in Table 5).
8While the evidence here suggests that on average more speeches improve predictability,
there is also evidence from Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007a) that if the views expressed by
policy makers become more dispersed that this may hamper predictability.
9I chose R2 rather than other goodness-of-￿t measures such as adjusted R2, Aikaike,
Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn. The essential di⁄erence between these measures is how they
discount for the number of dependent variables in the model. Here we have the same number
of variables in all cases, so all measures deliver the same ordering of the model.
10The highest value is based on the unrounded ￿gures. Due to the use of only 3 decimal
places, it may appear as if some values are equal in the table.
14R-squared 1 2 3 4 5 6 average
minutes, bias, guidance 0.217 0.274 0.233 0.136 * 0.139 0.189 0.198
statement, bias, guidance 0.213 0.264 0.228 0.126 0.139 * 0.189 0.193
rationale, bias, guidance 0.217 0.270 0.233 0.129 0.138 0.189 * 0.196
minutes, balance, guidance 0.223 * 0.275 * 0.234 0.136 0.139 0.187 0.199 *
statement, balance, guidance 0.219 0.265 0.228 0.125 0.139 0.186 0.194
rationale, balance, guidance 0.222 0.270 0.234 * 0.129 0.138 0.188 0.197
*highest R²
Table 4: Model comparisons using R2
Di⁄erences between the speci￿cations are very small, all within a range of
0.005. The performance of the models is thus not very sensitive to the exact
starting point of the dummies11. Overall the speci￿cation used in the text above,
minutes-bias-guidance (￿rst row) is beaten by 0.001 by the minutes-balance-
guidance variant (fourth row). In other words, starting the ￿rst dummy at the
1993 minutes is supported by comparing the R2 measures12 while there may be
some doubt about the choice for the bias-dummy over the balance-dummy. A
closer look at the results from the minutes-bias-guidance speci￿cation is thus
warranted and shown in Table 5.
n=1 n=2 n=3 n=4 n=5 n=6
Constant (χ) -2.67 *** -2.09 *** -1.88 *** -1.49 *** -1.29 *** -1.81 ***
Constant (γ) 0.00 0.36 * 0.31 -0.06 -0.15 -0.52 **
Future rate (ʱ) 0.08 * 0.08 * 0.11 * 0.13 ** 0.18 ** 0.35 ***
Payrolls (β) -17.60 ** -29.01 *** -30.71 *** -21.94 ** -30.51 ** -51.12 ***
Minutes (ʴ1993) -0.51 * -0.65 *** -0.53 * -0.58 ** -0.54 * 0.17
Balance -0.42 -0.12 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.02
Guidance (ʴ2003) -0.84 *** -0.73 ** -0.56 -0.26 -0.14 -0.04
*p<10% **p<5% ***p<1%
Table 5: Impact of reforms on Fed funds future error, balance of
risks versus bias
11Endogenous break anlaysis is potentially another approach to identifying changes in the
predictability of the Fed funds rate that could be caused by shifts in communication policy.
However, considering there are speci￿c dates for the start of each policy the fundamental
problem of this analysis is not identifying where potential breaks might be. Indeed, the
question is somewhat the reverse. We can identify changes in policy, the question is if these
had a signi￿cant e⁄ect. Furthermore, with model speci￿cations of various candidates for the
￿rst and second dummy having such similar explanatory power, it does not seem likely that a
particular breakpoint would be useful in selecting one dummy starting point from the other.
12Another argument in favor of the minutes-dummy is that in the table in the Appendix it
is signi￿cant for a longer forecast horizons than either the statement-dummy or the rationale-
dummy.
15In terms of signi￿cance of coe¢ cients, the results in Table 5 are very similar
to Table 3. The only qualitative di⁄erence is that the guidance dummy is
not signi￿cant at the three month timeframe in Table 5. Starting the second
dummy at the introduction of the balance-of-risks, rather than the release of
the bias, results in a slightly stronger decline in errors. This makes sense,
given the perception by FOMC members that the release of the bias was not a
success. However, in both variants the coe¢ cient for the second dummy remains
insigni￿cant. As the very similar R2 measures suggest, the results are basically
comparable. Given this, I continue to favor the release of the bias as a more
natural starting point for the second dummy, because it is clearly a predecessor
to the balance-of-payments and signaled the start of a more forward looking
communication policy distinct from the reforms of the early to mid 1990s (which
focused instead on explaining current monetary policy).
7 Conclusion
Distinguishing di⁄erent periods of innovation in the communication policy of the
Federal Open Market Committee reveals important di⁄erences between these
reforms. From 2003 the accuracy of the Fed funds futures was aided by the
FOMC￿ s explicit guidance about the likely direction of interest rates. Signaling
the short term ￿bias￿of monetary policy or the ￿balance of risks￿ , however, did
not help. The earlier reforms of the mid 1990s, when the FOMC introduced the
new minutes and the post-meeting statement, also improved predictability. Ex-
plaining why monetary policy was set as it was probably helped the markets to
better understand and anticipate interest rate changes even though the FOMC
did not communicate its own outlook until later. It is also possible that during
the same period FOMC members became more communicative through already
available channels of communication. Evidence that speeches and Congressional
testimony improves predictability suggests that such ￿old￿channels may also
have played a role in advancing predictability.
168 Appendix
n=1 n=2 n=3 n=4 n=5 n=6
Constant (χ) -2.75 *** -2.22 *** -1.99 *** -1.68 *** -1.36 *** -1.68 ***
Constant (γ) 0.01 0.33 0.30 -0.05 -0.15 -0.54 **
Future rate (ʱ) 0.08 * 0.09 * 0.12 ** 0.15 ** 0.18 *** 0.34 ***
Payrolls (β) -16.91 ** -31.08 *** -33.42 *** -28.16 *** -32.15 *** -45.92 ***
Statement -0.47 * -0.54 ** -0.40 -0.30 -0.51 ** -0.05
Bias (ʴ1999) -0.27 -0.03 -0.01 -0.14 0.08 0.22
Guidance (ʴ2003) -0.95 *** -0.79 ** -0.53 * -0.15 -0.13 -0.15
*p<10% **p<5% ***p<1%
Table 6: Impact of reforms on Fed funds future error, statement
rather than minutes
n=1 n=2 n=3 n=4 n=5 n=6
Constant (χ) -2.75 *** -2.21 *** -1.97 *** -1.66 *** -1.41 *** -1.77 ***
Constant (γ) 0.00 0.35 * 0.30 -0.05 -0.15 -0.55 **
Future rate (ʱ) 0.08 * 0.09 * 0.12 ** 0.15 ** 0.19 *** 0.35 ***
Payrolls (β) -16.98 ** -29.68 *** -33.04 *** -27.44 *** -33.08 *** -48.90 ***
Rationale -0.53 ** -0.63 *** -0.49 * -0.36 -0.48 ** 0.08
Bias (ʴ1999) -0.21 0.04 0.06 -0.09 0.09 0.16
Guidance (ʴ2003) -0.94 *** -0.79 ** -0.53 * -0.15 -0.12 -0.14
*p<10% **p<5% ***p<1%
Table 7: Impact of reforms on Fed funds future error, rationale
rather than minutes
n=1 n=2 n=3 n=4 n=5 n=6
Constant (χ) -2.76 *** -2.22 *** -1.99 *** -1.67 *** -1.36 *** -1.70 ***
Constant (γ) -0.01 0.33 0.30 -0.07 -0.15 -0.51 *
Future rate (ʱ) 0.08 * 0.10 * 0.12 ** 0.15 ** 0.18 *** 0.33 ***
Payrolls (β) -17.52 ** -31.22 *** -33.20 *** -26.86 ** -32.24 *** -47.65 ***
Statement -0.43 -0.50 ** -0.42 -0.37 -0.50 * 0.04
Balance -0.42 -0.13 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.06
Guidance (ʴ2003) -0.84 *** -0.73 ** -0.56 -0.24 -0.13 -0.06
*p<10% **p<5% ***p<1%
Table 8: Impact of reforms on Fed funds future error, statement
rather than minutes, balance of risks rather than bias
17n=1 n=2 n=3 n=4 n=5 n=6
Constant (χ) -2.75 *** -2.21 *** -1.97 *** -1.65 *** -1.41 *** -1.78 ***
Constant (γ) -0.02 0.34 0.30 -0.07 -0.15 -0.52 **
Future rate (ʱ) 0.08 ** 0.09 * 0.12 ** 0.15 ** 0.19 *** 0.35 ***
Payrolls (β) -17.55 ** -30.03 *** -32.93 *** -26.18 *** -33.24 *** -50.61 ***
Rationale -0.49 * -0.58 *** -0.50 * -0.44 -0.47 * 0.17
Balance -0.37 -0.07 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.00
Guidance (ʴ2003) -0.84 *** -0.73 ** -0.56 -0.24 -0.12 -0.05
*p<10% **p<5% ***p<1%
Table 9: Impact of reforms on Fed funds future error, rationale
rather than minutes and balance of risks rather than bias
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